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    Scritto da
    Non Autenticato
    il 2011-06-03 00:42:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 00:42:00.0
    crittare traffico Tor
    Tor critta il traffico dalla partenza all'ultimo exit node però tra l'ultimo exit node e la destinazione è in chiaro

    quindi se immetti password possono essere ad esempio scovate

    ricordo che lessi anni fa su come crittare l'ultimo tratto ,ma dovrei aggiornarmi

    come fare secondo voi?

    per i siti si può usare l'https in qualche modo ..ma come di preciso se non lo prevedono?

    per i programmi ? tipo messenger etc ?
    • Avatar
      ☺
      Scritto da
      gengiva
      Utente privileggiato
      il 2011-06-03 00:49:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 00:49:00.0
      Trollate totali: 9100
      Re: crittare traffico Tor

      - Scritto da:
      > Tor critta il traffico dalla partenza all'ultimo
      > exit node però tra l'ultimo exit node e la
      > destinazione è in chiaro
      >
      >
      > quindi se immetti password possono essere ad
      > esempio
      > scovate
      >
      > ricordo che lessi anni fa su come crittare
      > l'ultimo tratto ,ma dovrei aggiornarmi
      >
      >
      > come fare secondo voi?
      >
      > per i siti si può usare l'https in qualche modo
      > ..ma come di preciso se non lo
      > prevedono?
      >
      > per i programmi ? tipo messenger etc ?


      troppo tardi sei fottuto... yoda Newbie, inesperto
      Cercatelo con Google, ritardato! ©
    • Avatar
      Scritto da
      Non Autenticato
      il 2011-06-03 02:44:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 02:44:00.0
      Re: crittare traffico Tor
      - Scritto da:
      > Tor critta il traffico dalla partenza all'ultimo
      > exit node però tra l'ultimo exit node e la
      > destinazione è in chiaro
      >
      >
      > quindi se immetti password possono essere ad
      > esempio
      > scovate
      >
      > ricordo che lessi anni fa su come crittare
      > l'ultimo tratto ,ma dovrei aggiornarmi
      >
      >
      > come fare secondo voi?
      >
      > per i siti si può usare l'https in qualche modo
      > ..ma come di preciso se non lo
      > prevedono?
      >
      > per i programmi ? tipo messenger etc ?


      mi sono aggiornato e ho ritrovato questo


      Other programs are: Stunnel, Freecap, Privoxy and Tor.

      They are all very easy to use and really can be setup by a newbie if you follow the setup instructions I offer in Part 2. They are totally transparent to the user. Once setup there is no maintenance or searching for proxies, etc. It is all done in the background with no further unput required from you.

      26. Tell me more about these programs?

      Stunnel encrypts the data between you and your news server and is very simple to use.

      Freecap is also easy to setup and acts as the bridge between Stunnel and Tor.



      27. Is the data encrypted after it leaves the remote server and Tor?

      Yes, providing you are using Stunnel. The only precaution you must take to ensure both privacy and anonymity, is to use Stunnel in combination with FreeCap, which ensurres it routes all data over the Tor network.

      It is possible to use Stunnel alone, but not recommended.

      ..

      Stunnel is used for NNTP secure connections to your news provider.

      Stunnel: http://www.stunnel.org/download/binaries.html

      Stunnel requires the executable file plus 2 others.

      stunnel-4.05.exe stunnel-4.05.exe.asc (digital signature file optional but recommended)

      OpenSSL Libraries (required files). These are put in the same folder as Stunnel:

      libssl32.dll libeay32.dll

      libssl32.dll.asc (optional) libeay32.dll.asc (optional)

      FreeCap: http://www.freecap.ru/eng/?p=index





      • Avatar
        Scritto da
        Non Autenticato
        il 2011-06-03 02:47:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 02:47:00.0
        Re: crittare traffico Tor
        For the other files, create a new folder called Proxy. Open Proxy and create the following sub-folders: FreeCap, Stunnel, Privoxy, Tor

        Install by copying all of the downloaded files into their respective folders. Ensure the library files for Stunnel are in the same sub-folder. The latest version of Tor now includes a Windows install.

        Each program can then have shortcuts made and placed on your desktop, or wherever you choose if different.

        ..

        39. How do I configure Stunnel?

        Stunnel is required for an NNTPS, meaning secure, connection to Usenet.

        Copy and paste all of the following in Notepad and save it in the Stunnel folder, name the file stunnel.conf:

        #Stunnel client configuration file # client = yes options = ALL RNDbytes = 2048 RNDfile = bananarand.bin RNDoverwrite = yes # #[Meganetnews_NNTPS] #accept = 119 #connect = news.meganetnews.com:563 #delay = no # [nntps] accept = 119 connect = secure.news.easynews.com:563 delay = no # #[nntps] #accept = 119 #connect = news.x-privat.org:563 #delay = no # #[Octanews_NNTPS] #accept = 119 #connect = snews.octanews.com:563 #delay = no # #[putty_nntps] #accept = 119 #connect = 127.0.0.1:563 #delay = no # # End of config file

        Remove the # from the beginning of any bunch of lines you wish to make active. The above is setup to optionally allow (When the # is removed) routing through several news providers using a secure SSL connection.

        Note the lines:

        [putty_nntps] accept = 119 connect = 127.0.0.1:563 delay = no

        This is an option to route your Usenet connection through a SSH (Secure Shell) host server using Putty.

        This option is strongly recommended for Usenet posting when used together with Tor for maximum anonymity and security.

        The file (stunnel.conf) does not exist until you create it. Stunnel cannot work without its presence. You will just get some server error. This might happen if you or Windows names it incorrectly.

        You may need to get Explorer to show extensions to known file types, otherwise Windows may save the file as stunnel.conf.txt. If you are not sure, go to Tools > Folder Options > View > uncheck "Hide extensions to known file types". Click on Ok.

        Note: In the previous Faq I had shown a long list of various remailers. I have omitted them all from the above config file as the latest Quicksilver allows direct connections into Tor and thence on to the remailer network. This means it is easier and quicker to send and receive mail using Quicksilver and Tor.

        If you want options I suggest creating several folders called Stunnel 1, Stunnel 2, etc and copy Stunnel.exe plus the two library files and stunnel.conf into each. Now make active different combinations of the above in each folder. Ensure that only one option is active in each stunnel.conf file or you may get conflicts and problems. Create shortcuts to each stunnel.exe and copy to your desktop (renaming as necessary).

        40. How do I configure FreeCap?

        Go > File > Settings > Proxy Settings > Default Proxy. Type 127.0.0.1 into the server window and 9050 into Port. Click OK. Under Protocol ensure SOCKS v5 is checked.

        With the program back at the opening screen, drag and drop the Stunnel shortcuts into the FreeCap window. You will immediately see the Stunnel icons position themselves along the top of the screen. As each is loaded, re-name it to easily distinguish it from the others. Do this by right-clicking on an icon and selecting Modify. Change the name on the top line to something self-descriptive, such as Easynews or Putty or whatever.

        You have now socksified Stunnel. That is all it takes. Whenever you run Stunnel you must start it by clicking on one of the icons from within FreeCap, which obviously means first starting Freecap. Stunnel secures the programs and by socksifying it with Freecap, ensures all data is routed over the Tor network. Just minimize Freecap after starting Stunnel. To close Stunnel, right click on its icon on the taskbar and select Exit.

        Note: Some may experience problems with FreeCap. If you do, an excellent, free for non-commercial use alternative, (but not open source) is SocksCap. It is here:

        http://www.socks.permeo.com/Download/SocksCapDownl...

        • Avatar
          Scritto da
          Non Autenticato
          il 2011-06-03 02:48:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 02:48:00.0
          Re: crittare traffico Tor
          ..

          Note: Stunnel can only be used with a news provider that offers a secure (NNTPS) connection (by default on port 563). For other news providers Stunnel is useless. For these less secure sites I suggest socksifying Agent, by dragging and dropping the Agent shortcut into FreeCap. Not nearly as secure, as your data will not be encrypted after it leaves the Tor network on its way to the News provider. It costs no more to subscribe to a secure news provider than it does to one that does not offer an encrypted connection. So why choose anything less?

          Each of these four programs, Stunnel, FreeCap, Privoxy and Tor accepts connections from either your Web browser, into Privoxy and on to Tor, or from your News client into Stunnel, socksified by FreeCap and again on to Tor. Many programs can be socksified, not just those mentioned. The procedure is exactly the same, just drag and drop the shortcut of the program to be socksified into Freecap.

          44. How do I test these are all working?

          Let's check the Web first.

          Start Privoxy (which by default normally starts with Windows).

          Open your browser and input: http://p.p/

          You should see the Privoxy main page with the following:

          "This is Privoxy 3.0.3 on localhost (127.0.0.1), port 8118, enabled."

          If you see that, be assured you have accessd via Privoxy.

          If you see "p.p. could not be found, please check the name and try again." You are definitely not accessing via Privoxy.

          Go back through the above and check everything very carefully.

          Note: This is an internal test, not via the Web. It just proves that Privoxy was invoked to display that page from its own folder, which you will see displayed if you click on "View and change the current configuration"

          You will then see a clear display of all the configuration settings.

          Do not change anything unless you have a backup file and know what you are doing.

          Let's assume your Web browser is functioning as it should and you see the p.p. page displaying the confirmatory message.

          You should now test your news reader client.

          45. How do I test my news connection is anonymous?

          Open FreeCap and click on the Stunnel icon in the FreeCap Window.

          Without opening Tor at this stage, start your news client. As a small precaution ensure you are in an appropriate newsgroup and attempt to download its headers. You should see connecting to 127.0.0.1 displayed on the lower taskbar in Agent or wherever in the version you are using, followed by error reported by Winsock driver. Good. This proves Stunnel was attempting to connect to Tor which is offline of course, thus no connection was possible.

          Now start Tor. Try again. Hopefully this time you will have more success and it should connect to the news server and start downloading headers.

          Note: It can sometimes take a considerable time to connect when using the Tor network. This is normal, but means patience is a virtue here.

          Go to a multimedia group and start to download a large file. While the download is in progress, close Tor. You should see an immediate error about connection to server closed unexpectedly. Good.

          Re-start Tor. Re-establish the connection with the server and start over. This time close FreeCap. Notice the download will continue. Do not panic! It is still accessing via Tor. Prove this for yourself by closing Tor and notice the download again stops immediately and there is the same Winsock error. However, do not normally close any of these programs until you are ready to go offline. Always close the news reader first to ensure no data is being accessed which might just possibly jump across and appear in the clear.

          The usual way to open each of these programs is go online with your ISP. Open Freecap, start Stunnel from within FreeCap. Open Tor, then last of all open your news reader. Test the system from time to time to satisfy yourself all is as it should be. Closing down is the reverse of this procedure.

          If you have got this far, you have succeeded in creating a secure and truly anonymous network connection for both your browser and your Usenet posting/downloading.

          Note: It is imperative that Stunnel be started only from within FreeCap and thus be socksified. Otherwise it will simply connect directly with your news provider, bypassing the Tor proxy network. Certainly it is an encrypted connection but totally useless from an anonymity point of view. Your ISP will know exactly where you are connected. Your news server could also log your ISP address!

          ...

          You will still need Stunnel to allow the NNTPS (encrypted) connection into your news provider and FreeCap to act as a bridge between Stunnel and Tor. Tor is the socks proxy that hides your true IP from the Secure Shell host server. As Putty will channel everything through port 22, you will have a lot more choice of exit servers with Tor.

          See the above example stunnel.conf file.

          The sequence is: Agent > Stunnel > Freecap > Tor > SSH server > news server (or wherever).

          This is the route to go for the strongest anonymity. It is especially recommended for hard anonymous posting to Usenet. For lurking, the requirements are not as critical and it is sufficient to just go Agent > Stunnel > Freecap > Tor > news server.


          • Avatar
            Scritto da
            Non Autenticato
            il 2011-06-03 21:09:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 21:09:00.0
            Re: crittare traffico Tor
            ho installato Stunnel e Freecap

            però non sono sicuro dell'utilità del loro uso

            cioè nella discussione parlava più che altro dell'uso su Usenet

            ma per altro tipo di connessioni?
            • Avatar
              Scritto da
              Non Autenticato
              il 2011-06-03 21:16:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 21:16:00.0
              Re: crittare traffico Tor
              - Scritto da:
              > ho installato Stunnel e Freecap
              >
              > però non sono sicuro dell'utilità del loro uso
              >
              > cioè nella discussione parlava più che altro
              > dell'uso su Usenet
              >
              >
              > ma per altro tipo di connessioni?

              mi rispondo da solo come al solito

              http://linuxgazette.net/107/odonovan.html

              http://home.arcor.de/lightsky/docs/stunnel_openssl...

              http://www.stunnel.org/static/stunnel.html

              http://www.stunnel.org/?page=howto

              http://www.stunnel.org/?page=faq

              http://www.stunnel.org/?page=sdf_todo

              http://www.stunnel.org/?page=perf
              • Avatar
                Scritto da
                Non Autenticato
                il 2011-06-03 21:32:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 21:32:00.0
                Re: crittare traffico Tor
                http://spampal.sanesecurity.com/manual_eng/servers...
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                  Scritto da
                  Non Autenticato
                  il 2011-06-03 22:02:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 22:02:00.0
                  Re: crittare traffico Tor
                  Non ci ho capito molto, ma mi inserisco nella conversazione per chiedere: come può crittare la comunicazione tra un nodo di uscita di Tor e un server qualsiasi?
                  • Avatar
                    Scritto da
                    Non Autenticato
                    il 2011-06-03 22:18:00.0 alle 2011-06-03 22:18:00.0
                    Re: crittare traffico Tor

                    - Scritto da:
                    > Non ci ho capito molto, ma mi inserisco nella
                    > conversazione per chiedere: come può crittare la
                    > comunicazione tra un nodo di uscita di Tor e un
                    > server
                    > qualsiasi?

                    dipende da che tipo di protocollo vi è

                    Stunnel pare che funzioni per IMAP POP3 SMTP e HTTP

                    a me servirebbe più che altro per entrare nelle email senza lasciare in chiaro le password ..però molti servizi email già hanno l'HTTPS non so se Stunnel possa avere utilità in questo caso

                    forse nel caso non sia prevista l'HTTPS aggiungerebbe una connessione SSH

                    e per i messenger? che protocollo usano?

                    e poi mi servirebbe per hostare in modo crittato quindi FTP


                    qualcuno mi chiarisca la faccenda
                    • Avatar
                      Scritto da
                      Non Autenticato
                      il 2011-06-04 19:11:00.0 alle 2011-06-04 19:11:00.0
                      Re: crittare traffico Tor
                      > > Non ci ho capito molto, ma mi inserisco nella
                      > > conversazione per chiedere: come può crittare la
                      > > comunicazione tra un nodo di uscita di Tor e un
                      > > server
                      > > qualsiasi?
                      >
                      > dipende da che tipo di protocollo vi è
                      >
                      > Stunnel pare che funzioni per IMAP POP3 SMTP e
                      > HTTP
                      >
                      > a me servirebbe più che altro per entrare nelle
                      > email senza lasciare in chiaro le password ..però
                      > molti servizi email già hanno l'HTTPS non so se
                      > Stunnel possa avere utilità in questo
                      > caso
                      >
                      > forse nel caso non sia prevista l'HTTPS
                      > aggiungerebbe una connessione SSH
                      >
                      >
                      > e per i messenger? che protocollo usano?
                      >
                      > e poi mi servirebbe per hostare in modo crittato
                      > quindi FTP
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > qualcuno mi chiarisca la faccenda

                      Voglio dire: se il server a cui ti connetti tramite Tor non supporta connessioni cifrate, il nodo in uscita si connetterà ad esso in chiaro.

                      No?

                      E tutte le tue password saranno visibili.

                      Inoltre, a meno che il disco del fornitore di email non sia cifrato, qualcuno con i mezzi giusti può andare a leggersele nel server.

                      Inoltre l'FBI dispone di backdoor presso gli ISP americani, quasi tutti. Infine una qualsiasi azienda, davanti alla cortese richiesta delle autorità di un qualche paese, vomita tutto ciò che sa, dietro minacce o in cambio di soldi, a meno che non si tratti di un'azienda o ente specificamente votato a difendere l'anonimato dei suoi utenti, dotato dei mezzi adatti per farlo. Perché ad esempio l'EFF non mette in pratica ciò che predica offrendo servizi anonimi?
                      • Avatar
                        Scritto da
                        Non Autenticato
                        il 2011-06-04 20:32:00.0 alle 2011-06-04 20:32:00.0
                        Re: crittare traffico Tor
                        in definitiva mi servirebbe crittare l'ultimo tratto di connessione per quanto riguarda

                        account email online ..quindi? ==> HTTPS?
                        Paypal e simili ===> HTTPS ?
                        ftp ===>
                        messenger===> ?
                        • Avatar
                          Scritto da
                          Non Autenticato
                          il 2011-06-04 20:40:00.0 alle 2011-06-04 20:40:00.0
                          Re: crittare traffico Tor
                          qui lo spiega molto bene per accedere a Bitcoin


                          How Tor works

                          Unlike Freenet, I2P, etc., Tor's security is very well-defined. While weaknesses do exist (described below), they have been known since Tor was created, and new weaknesses of significance are not expected.

                          Tor sends TCP packets over 3 (normal) or 7 (hidden services) Tor relays. This is why it is so slow: your packet might have to go through 100 computers (counting Internet routers) before it reaches its destination. Tor uses multiple layers of encryption that are pulled away for each node. Hence the name The Onion Router, which is always capitalized as Tor, and never TOR or t.o.r.

                          Say that I want to connect to bitcoin.org through Tor. I first select three Tor relays that I know about. Then, I send a message to my ISP that looks like this:

                          Send to this IP: <IP of Relay1>
                          <Encrypted data for Relay1>

                          When Relay1 receives this, he decrypts the payload using his private key. The payload contains this:

                          Send to this Tor node: <Relay2>
                          <Encrypted data for Relay2>

                          Relay2 decrypts his payload:

                          Send to this Tor node: <Relay3>
                          <Encrypted data for Relay3>

                          Relay3 receives the real TCP payload, which he sends to the destination:

                          Send to this IP: <IP of destination>
                          <Unencrypted payload>

                          The payload is not and can not be further encrypted by Tor. However, if the protocol itself uses encryption (HTTPS, SSH, etc.), the data will be encrypted. This means that the last node (the exit node) can see everything you do on HTTP sites, and can steal your passwords if they are transmitted unencrypted. Many people become exit nodes just so they can view this information -- Tor is much more dangerous than open WiFi for snooping!

                          The encryption arrangement described above ensures that no single Tor node knows both the sender and the destination. Relay1 and your ISP know that you are using Tor and sending a packet at a certain time, but they don't know what you're sending or who you're sending to. Relay3 knows exactly what you're sending, but he can't determine who is sending it because Relay2 and Relay1 are blocking him. All three relays need to work together in order to conclusively connect the sender and the destination.

                          However, Tor is weak to a timing attack that allows only two participants in certain positions to determine the sender with high accuracy. Consider this Tor connection:

                          Sender <-> S-ISP <-> Relay1 <-> Relay2 <-> Relay3 <-> D-ISP <-> Destination

                          If the sender's ISP (S-ISP) and the destination are working together, they can record the size and times of packets sent and received. Over a large number of packets, they can determine with very high accuracy that the sender is, in fact, the person sending packets to the destination. This requires active surveillance or detailed logging by both sides. Relay1 can also perform the same role as S-ISP.

                          Additionally, more configurations are possible if the underlying connection is not encrypted (normal HTTP, for example):

                              * S-ISP & Relay3
                              * Relay1 & Relay3
                              * S-ISP & D-ISP
                              * Relay1 & D-ISP

                          This second set can always see that the sender is connected to the destination, but they can only see what the sender is doing on the site if the connection is not encrypted. (Pathnames are encrypted in HTTPS.)

                          Because the first relay (the entry node) is a weak point in the connection, Tor takes certain defensive measures. When you first start Tor, it chooses three entry guards that don't change for the entire time that you run Tor. You will always use one of those three unless one goes down. If all of those nodes are safe and your ISP is safe, then you are OK.

                          These timing attacks are of special importance to Bitcoin because anyone can be the "destination" in a connection. Packets are broadcast to every peer in the Bitcoin network. This might allow your ISP alone to associate your transactions to you without much difficulty. However, a timing attack relies on receiving at least several dozen packets from the sender, so the "destination" might actually have to be one of your direct Bitcoin peers. It's not too difficult to flood the Bitcoin network with peers, though. Because of this attack, it is wise to use an EWallet instead of the Bitcoin client when using Tor.

                          To discover Tor relays, Tor uses a centralized directory server model. There are nine authoritative directory servers. To become a relay, you register with one of these. The directory servers share their data and produce a network status consensus document every so often containing all Tor nodes. Tor clients don't connect directly to the authoritative directory servers -- they connect to one of many directory mirrors, which have a copy of the network status consensus. Since there is no peer-to-peer bootstrap mechanism in Tor, the entire network can be destroyed if half of the authoritative directory servers are destroyed, and the entire network can be subverted if half of the authoritative directory servers become evil.

                          Hidden services allow both the sender and destination to remain anonymous. A hidden service connection is made like this:

                              * The destination tells several Tor relays to act as introduction points for the hidden service. The destination stays connected to all of these introduction points through a regular three-node Tor circuit.
                              * The destination registers these introduction points on a Tor DHT. The introduction points are associated with the first 16 characters of an encoded SHA-1 hash of the destination's key. This is the information in .onion addresses. The use of SHA-1 is a possible weakness.
                              * The sender creates a four-node Tor circuit. The fourth node is called the rendezvous point.
                              * The sender searches the DHT for the introduction points of the desired hidden service. The sender connects to one through a regular three-node Tor circuit and, through the introduction point, tells the destination about the rendezvous point he has chosen.
                              * The destination connects to the rendezvous point over a three-node Tor circuit. The sender and destination are now in contact over a seven-node connection.

                          For clients, hidden services are more secure than encrypted Tor HTTPS connections because:

                              * If the destination remains anonymous, they are less likely to become controlled by an evil party.
                              * The destination's ISP isn't involved as they are in the HTTPS case. Only these configurations are possible for a timing attack:
                                   o S-ISP & Destination
                                   o Relay1 & Destination

                          Running a hidden service is more dangerous, however. A simple intersection attack can be performed by the hidden service's ISP alone:

                              * Your Internet service is cut off.
                              * If the hidden service went down at that exact moment, you are unmasked.

                          The same sort of timing attacks as above are also possible.

                          See the Tor design paper for more info.
                          https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Tor

<softv>

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